by Martin D. Weiss, Ph.D. 06-22-0
The Guardian newspaper reports staff at Goldman Sachs can look forward to the
biggest bonus payouts in the firm’s 140-year history after a spectacular first
half of the year, sparking concern that the big investment banks which survived
the credit crunch will derail financial regulation reforms. We speak to Nomi
Prins, a former managing director for Goldman Sachs in New York, about the
possible record bonuses, President Obama’s proposed reforms of the financial
regulatory system and the “The Big Bank Bailout Payback Bamboozle.” [includes
rush transcript]
AMY GOODMAN: We turn now to what’s happening here at home, the financial
crisis. Juan?
JUAN GONZALEZ: Well, last week, President Obama presented his vision for
reforming the US financial regulatory system, saying the new regulations would
prevent the kind of abuses that created the current crisis. He said they would
fundamentally address the, quote, “crisis of irresponsibility [that] took root
from Wall Street to Washington to Main Street.” The administration’s proposal is
laid out in an eighty-five-page white paper that Obama described as outlining
the most sweeping overhaul of the system since the reforms following the Great
Depression.
PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: It is an indisputable fact that one of the most
significant contributors to our economic downturn was a unraveling of major
financial institutions and the lack of adequate regulatory structures to prevent
abuse and excess. A culture of irresponsibility took root from Wall Street to
Washington to Main Street. […]
We were facing one of the largest financial crises in history, and those
responsible for oversight were mostly caught off guard and without the authority
needed to address the problem.
It’s time for that to change. I am proposing that the Federal Reserve be granted
new authority and accountability for regulating bank holding companies and other
large firms that pose a risk to the entire economy in the event of failure. […]
As part of these reforms, we will dismantle the Office of Thrift Supervision and
close loopholes that have allowed important institutions to cherry-pick among
banking rules. We will offer only one federal banking charter, regulated by a
strengthened federal supervisor. We’ll raise capital requirements for all
depository institutions. Hedge fund advisers will be required to register with
the SEC.
We’re also proposing comprehensive regulation of credit default swaps and other
derivatives that have threatened the entire financial system. And we will
require the originator of a loan to retain an economic interest in that loan, so
that the lender—and not just the holder of a security, for example—has an
interest in ensuring that a loan is actually paid back. By setting commonsense
rules, these kinds of financial instruments can play a constructive, rather than
destructive, role.
JUAN GONZALEZ: The proposal also includes the creation of a Consumer Financial
Protection Agency. In his weekly radio address and internet address Saturday,
President Obama defended the proposed agency, saying it would set harsh new
rules to stop deceptive lending practices.
PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: And one of the most important proposals is a new
oversight agency called the Consumer Financial Protection Agency. It’s charged
with just one job: looking out for the interests of ordinary Americans in the
financial system. This is essential, for this crisis may have started on Wall
Street, but its impacts have been felt by ordinary Americans who rely on credit
cards, home loans and other financial instruments.
It’s true that this crisis was caused in part by Americans who took on too much
debt and took out loans they simply could not afford. But there are also
millions of Americans who signed contracts they didn’t always understand,
offered by lenders who didn’t always tell the truth. […] This new agency will
have the responsibility to change that.
AMY GOODMAN: Economist, journalist, Demos senior fellow and former investment
banker Nomi Prins thinks that Obama’s new plan is not such a sweeping overhaul
of the financial system, after all. She is the author of the forthcoming book It
Takes a Pillage: Behind the Bailouts, Bonuses, and Backroom Deals from
Washington to Wall Street. Her latest article is an assessment of Obama’s reform
proposals. It’s called “Obama’s New Economic Plan: The Good, the Bad and the
Weak.” It was just published in Mother Jones. She joins us here in our firehouse
studio.
Before you comment on the whole plan that was laid out, this latest news. You
used to work at Bear Stearns, and you worked at Goldman Sachs. Goldman Sachs has
just said that their staff can look forward to the biggest bonus bailouts in the
firm’s 140-year history. How is this possible?
NOMI PRINS: It is possible because our government has chosen to effectively give
Goldman the money to do that, in a number of different ways. One is the $10
billion that it got through the TARP program, which both Goldman and the
government want us to believe is the only bit of federal subsidy it has gotten,
which is why, when it said it would pay back the TARP program, it was all this
gesture of “we’re healthy, we’re good, we’re paying it back, we didn’t really
need it,” but really they didn’t want government oversight attached to it, not
that there was a lot.
The bigger amount of money that has gone to Goldman has come through $12.9
billion from the AIG bailout that went straight to Goldman, its biggest
counterparty; $28 billion worth of FDIC-backed guaranteed debt, meaning the FDIC
put up a program last fall, and it said, “For banks that deal with
consumers”—not banks that deal with multibillion-dollar companies or investors,
but people—“we will provide guarantees for debt,” which means that those
companies can raise debt to help consumers cheaply. Goldman said, “Alright,
fine, we’ll take some of that.” And they took $28 billion worth of that, and
they have up to $35 billion that they can take under the FDIC program that was
never meant for a company like Goldman Sachs.
In addition, there is a ton of money, there are trillions of dollars at the Fed,
not all of that went to Goldman, but that has secretly gone to a number of banks
in the system, of which Goldman is one, for which the Fed refuses to disclose
any information or any detail, which also goes into this. So when Goldman
says—has the nerve to say, feels entitled to say—that it’s going to pay its
bankers record bonuses after the travesty that it and other banks have created
in the markets, it is on the back of federal subsidies that effectively come
from our pockets.
JUAN GONZALEZ: Well, I think you’ve made the point that the $780 billion-odd
TARP money is only a small portion, that the actual federal support for the
banking industry is about $13 trillion?
NOMI PRINS: That’s exactly right. The media has constantly focused, and Wall
Street has been very happy about this focus, on this measly—and I say
“measly”—$700 billion worth of TARP money that Congress allowed to be allocated
last October. And that money has gone out to a number of banks, including
Goldman and JPMorgan and Bank of America, Citigroup and other banks.
But in addition to that, there have been over two-and-a-half trillion dollars’
worth of guarantees and other types of subsidies from the Treasury Department;
over seven-and-a-half trillion from the Federal Reserve, which a lot has gone
through the bank at—the New York Federal Reserve during the Tim Geithner period,
when he was running it, as well as the Federal Reserve component in Washington;
and then all these extra FDIC guarantees, which have the backing of the Fed and
the Treasury Department.
So we’re talking about almost 13.6, actually, now—the count keeps going up every
time I look at it—trillion dollars’ worth of subsidization of the banking
industry. $700 billion is a part—it’s a big part, but there are so many more
trillions, that just do not get the right coverage and the right perspective
from the media, that exists, that are secret. Some are not. But it’s a lot, a
lot of money. It could basically pay for every single mortgage in this country
and healthcare and subsidizing student loans. So when it wants to, the
government can come up with a way to subsidize what it wants to subsidize. It
chose to subsidize the banking industry.
AMY GOODMAN: Nomi Prins, let’s talk about how this fits into what President
Obama just laid out this past week.
NOMI PRINS: Well, so, Obama said a couple of things in his proposal, his
eighty-eight-page white paper that will be created into a big congressional 400-
or 500- or 600-page paper for debate probably later in some sort of an act.
There were three things that he basically proposed.
When we talked—you had a clip just now on the Consumer Financial Protection
Agency. That is a good idea. It is high time there is some agency in Washington
that is on par with the SEC or the Fed or other regulatory bodies, if this
agency can be given that kind of enforcement and power. The agency that would
look at mortgage loans being more transparent and safer for individuals,
potentially capping credit cards, and most importantly, making sure that the
banks who issue the loans and who also package them up and sell them globally
and make tons of money on it actually have to keep some of those loans and some
of those packages on their own books, so if there are losses, they get hit with
the losses—that’s the part that the banking industry has gone up in arms about.
This one agency is the part that the Wall Street banks have been most upset
about, which is why we know that it could be the best part of his proposal, if
it gets the play and the enforcement capabilities it deserves. But it’s going to
be a knock-down, drag-out fight.
The other things that this proposal did was a little bit of a shuffling of deck
chairs, unfortunately, in the regulatory system. We had something called an
Office of Thrift Supervision, which was effectively responsible for monitoring
S&Ls. And the most problematic S&L, which was AIG—now, we think of AIG as an
insurance company slash hedge fund slash a thing that took $220 billion worth of
federal subsidies because its systemic failure would ruin the world. However,
AIG is actually classified as an S&L. The Office of Thrift Supervision, which is
not equipped to deal with an S&L of the complexity of an AIG, which isn’t really
one, failed in that responsibility. They’re being deleted, and they and another
regulatory body in Washington, the Office of Comptroller of the Treasury, will
be consolidated into a new regulatory agency called the National Banking
Supervisor. Those are two things.
JUAN GONZALEZ: Well, I’d like to ask you about the—I guess the nuclear bomb of
all this financial crisis, which was the question of all of these unregulated
derivatives and credit default swaps that were occurring basically outside the
banking system and that the Obama administration is now claiming that it will
attempt to regulate. But you’re a little skeptical about what you’ve seen so far
of the proposal, right?
NOMI PRINS: The proposal has said, quote, “it will regulate standardized OTC,”
which are over-the-counter, these types of derivatives—“standardized” meaning
the ones that basically are so generic they’re not actually that harmful.
What was harmful in this particular saga were things called CDOs, which were
collateralized debt obligations, which were packages of derivatives and all
sorts of other things combined with loans and other types of securities. And two
trillion of those were issued. But the leverage, or the amount that banks could
borrow on the back of that, ranged from ten to thirty times. So a $2 trillion
set of stuff became something like a $20 trillion to $60 trillion set of risk.
Those are things that will not be under the Obama plan for regulation.
And again, these are things that have been lobbied substantially by the banking
industry. “Do not take the least generic things, the most complex things, that
we can make the most amount of money out of, because neither the regulators nor
our investors, frankly, really understand what we’re doing in them. Do not take
those away from us.” And the administration was like, “OK, but we’re going to
create this sort of sweeping standardized regulatory system for some of the
derivatives.” Will it help a little bit? Yes. Will it help the real problem? No,
it will not.
AMY GOODMAN: You referred to this, Nomi, in discussing Goldman Sachs, but the
bigger picture of what you call the “big bank bailout payback bamboozle”?
NOMI PRINS: Well, this is part of the $13.6 trillion versus the $700 billion. A
couple weeks ago, ten banks said—or were allowed by the Treasury Department to
pay back all or a portion of the TARP money they had received. One was Goldman,
that had $10 billion; one was JPMorgan Chase, that had $25 billion; and so
forth. The collective money of those ten banks was $68 billion they would be
paying back. They happen to owe $229 billion.
The media didn’t really mention that part. They only mentioned, “Oh, the banks
are paying back this money. Things must be healthy. The financial system must be
stabilizing. And all is sort of good.”
The reality is, they owe $229 billion just from the FDIC guarantees they were
able to use and from the AIG money. That does not include the trillions of
dollars—and this is the biggest problem in all of this—that are on the Fed’s
books that we do not know how it was divided out among these banks. So we know
of $229 billion. We also know there are multiple trillions of dollars on the
Fed’s books that went out to these and other banks. We don’t know how much,
because they will not disclose that information.
AMY GOODMAN: Why aren’t they forced to?
NOMI PRINS: Well, this is the biggest part of both the overhaul that Obama has
mentioned and also the fact that the Fed is the most powerful regulator already.
They’re responsible for the banking system. They’re responsible for subsidizing
it.
There have been multiple FOIA requests, Freedom of Information Act requests, to
the Fed from bodies between—I worked with The Nation to try to get information,
through to Bloomberg to Fox. The entire spectrum of media has tried to get
information from the Fed on these loans, and the Fed has basically said—and
Bernanke has said this to the Senate and to the House—that this would actually
be dangerous. It would be dangerous to give this information out, because
somehow if people knew, it would create some larger catastrophic situation.
The reality is, we kind of know who these banks are. The bigger banks have the
tightest relationship with the Fed. They actually own portions of the Fed,
because they actually own shares in the Fed. They have an incredibly symbiotic
relationship. And they’ve gotten trillions of dollars of subsidies. We don’t
know what the Fed won’t say. The Fed hasn’t been made to say.
JUAN GONZALEZ: I’d like to ask you one last question. Both Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs were allowed in September, right in the midst of the crisis, to
turn themselves into bank holding companies overnight. Could you explain the
significance of that?
NOMI PRINS: Yeah. There was a chaotic Sunday evening, September 21st, where
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley noted that Lehman Brothers had just fallen
apart, that they actually did not have enough money to pay their ongoing
day-to-day debts. They were literally about to become insolvent, one or both of
these institutions.
The only thing that they could do is push the Fed to allow them to become bank
holding companies, which would give them access to federal subsidies. Just
legally, in terms of the legislative construct, if they get to be a bank holding
company, they get more access to our money. So they said, “OK.” The Fed, at
night, on a Sunday, without even waiting for the five-day mandatory antitrust
period, decided “OK, fine.” That enabled Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs to
become bank holding companies, to get under the public subsidy tent, and to get
a lot of this money, the FDIC guarantees, the Fed backing and everything else.
And that was the Fed’s decision. They could have said no. They said, “Come on,
and we’ll do it really quick. Just tell us where to sign.”
AMY GOODMAN: Nomi Prins, we want to thank you for being with us. Nomi Prins is
an economist. She used to work with Goldman Sachs and Bear Stearns; now she is
exposing them. Her article, “The Big Bank Bailout Payback Bamboozle,” appears in
Mother Jones, and her article “Obama’s New Economic Plan: The Good, the Bad and
the Weak” is at Alternet.org.
Bill Moyers Interview
with William K. Black
April 3rd 2009
For months now, revelations of the wholesale greed and blatant transgressions of
Wall Street have reminded us that "The Best Way to Rob a Bank Is to Own One." In
fact, the man you're about to meet wrote a book with just that title. It was
based upon his experience as a tough regulator during one of the darkest
chapters in our financial history: the savings and loan scandal in the late
1980s.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: These numbers as large as they are, vastly understate the problem of fraud.
BILL MOYERS: Bill Black was in New York this week for a conference at the John
Jay College of Criminal Justice where scholars and journalists gathered to ask
the question, "How do they get away with it?" Well, no one has asked that
question more often than Bill Black.
The former Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention now teaches Economics
and Law at the University of Missouri, Kansas City. During the savings and loan
crisis, it was Black who accused then-house speaker Jim Wright and five US
Senators, including John Glenn and John McCain, of doing favors for the S&L's in
exchange for contributions and other perks. The senators got off with a slap on
the wrist, but so enraged was one of those bankers, Charles Keating — after whom
the senate's so-called "Keating Five" were named — he sent a memo that read, in
part, "get Black — kill him dead." Metaphorically, of course. Of course.
Now Black is focused on an even greater scandal, and he spares no one — not even
the President he worked hard to elect, Barack Obama. But his main targets are
the Wall Street barons, heirs of an earlier generation whose scandalous rip-offs
of wealth back in the 1930s earned them comparison to Al Capone and the mob, and
the nickname "banksters."
Bill Black, welcome to the Journal.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Thank you.
BILL MOYERS: I was taken with your candor at the conference here in New York to
hear you say that this crisis we're going through, this economic and financial
meltdown is driven by fraud. What's your definition of fraud?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Fraud is deceit. And the essence of fraud is, "I create trust
in you, and then I betray that trust, and get you to give me something of
value." And as a result, there's no more effective acid against trust than
fraud, especially fraud by top elites, and that's what we have.
BILL MOYERS: In your book, you make it clear that calculated dishonesty by
people in charge is at the heart of most large corporate failures and scandals,
including, of course, the S&L, but is that true? Is that what you're saying
here, that it was in the boardrooms and the CEO offices where this fraud began?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Absolutely.
BILL MOYERS: How did they do it? What do you mean?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, the way that you do it is to make really bad loans,
because they pay better. Then you grow extremely rapidly, in other words, you're
a Ponzi-like scheme. And the third thing you do is we call it leverage. That
just means borrowing a lot of money, and the combination creates a situation
where you have guaranteed record profits in the early years. That makes you
rich, through the bonuses that modern executive compensation has produced. It
also makes it inevitable that there's going to be a disaster down the road.
BILL MOYERS: So you're suggesting, saying that CEOs of some of these banks and
mortgage firms in order to increase their own personal income, deliberately set
out to make bad loans?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Yes.
BILL MOYERS: How do they get away with it? I mean, what about their own checks
and balances in the company? What about their accounting divisions?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: All of those checks and balances report to the CEO, so if the
CEO goes bad, all of the checks and balances are easily overcome. And the art
form is not simply to defeat those internal controls, but to suborn them, to
turn them into your greatest allies. And the bonus programs are exactly how you
do that.
BILL MOYERS: If I wanted to go looking for the parties to this, with a good bird dog, where would you send me?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, that's exactly what hasn't happened. We haven't looked,
all right? The Bush Administration essentially got rid of regulation, so if
nobody was looking, you were able to do this with impunity and that's exactly
what happened. Where would you look? You'd look at the specialty lenders. The
lenders that did almost all of their work in the sub-prime and what's called
Alt-A, liars' loans.
BILL MOYERS: Yeah. Liars' loans--
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Liars' loans.
BILL MOYERS: Why did they call them liars' loans?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Because they were liars' loans.
BILL MOYERS: And they knew it?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: They knew it. They knew that they were frauds.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Liars' loans mean that we don't check. You tell us what your
income is. You tell us what your job is. You tell us what your assets are, and
we agree to believe you. We won't check on any of those things. And by the way,
you get a better deal if you inflate your income and your job history and your
assets.
BILL MOYERS: You think they really said that to borrowers?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: We know that they said that to borrowers. In fact, they were
also called, in the trade, ninja loans.
BILL MOYERS: Ninja?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Yeah, because no income verification, no job verification, no
asset verification.
BILL MOYERS: You're talking about significant American companies.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Huge! One company produced as many losses as the entire Savings and Loan debacle.
BILL MOYERS: Which company?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: IndyMac specialized in making liars' loans. In 2006 alone, it
sold $80 billion dollars of liars' loans to other companies. $80 billion.
BILL MOYERS: And was this happening exclusively in this sub-prime mortgage business?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: No, and that's a big part of the story as well. Even prime
loans began to have non-verification. Even Ronald Reagan, you know, said,
"Trust, but verify." They just gutted the verification process. We know that
will produce enormous fraud, under economic theory, criminology theory, and two
thousand years of life experience.
BILL MOYERS: Is it possible that these complex instruments were deliberately
created so swindlers could exploit them?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Oh, absolutely. This stuff, the exotic stuff that you're
talking about was created out of things like liars' loans, that were known to be
extraordinarily bad. And now it was getting triple-A ratings. Now a triple-A
rating is supposed to mean there is zero credit risk. So you take something that
not only has significant, it has crushing risk. That's why it's toxic. And you
create this fiction that it has zero risk. That itself, of course, is a
fraudulent exercise. And again, there was nobody looking, during the Bush years.
So finally, only a year ago, we started to have a Congressional investigation of
some of these rating agencies, and it's scandalous what came out. What we know
now is that the rating agencies never looked at a single loan file. When they
finally did look, after the markets had completely collapsed, they found, and
I'm quoting Fitch, the smallest of the rating agencies, "the results were
disconcerting, in that there was the appearance of fraud in nearly every file we
examined."
BILL MOYERS: So if your assumption is correct, your evidence is sound, the bank,
the lending company, created a fraud. And the ratings agency that is supposed to
test the value of these assets knowingly entered into the fraud. Both parties
are committing fraud by intention.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Right, and the investment banker that — we call it pooling —
puts together these bad mortgages, these liars' loans, and creates the toxic
waste of these derivatives. All of them do that. And then they sell it to the
world and the world just thinks because it has a triple-A rating it must
actually be safe. Well, instead, there are 60 and 80 percent losses on these
things, because of course they, in reality, are toxic waste.
BILL MOYERS: You're describing what Bernie Madoff did to a limited number of
people. But you're saying it's systemic, a systemic Ponzi scheme.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Oh, Bernie was a piker. He doesn't even get into the front
ranks of a Ponzi scheme...
BILL MOYERS: But you're saying our system became a Ponzi scheme.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Our system...
BILL MOYERS: Our financial system...
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Became a Ponzi scheme. Everybody was buying a pig in the poke.
But they were buying a pig in the poke with a pretty pink ribbon, and the pink
ribbon said, "Triple-A."
BILL MOYERS: Is there a law against liars' loans?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Not directly, but there, of course, many laws against fraud,
and liars' loans are fraudulent.
BILL MOYERS: Because...
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Because they're not going to be repaid and because they had
false representations. They involve deceit, which is the essence of fraud.
BILL MOYERS: Why is it so hard to prosecute? Why hasn't anyone been brought to
justice over this?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Because they didn't even begin to investigate the major
lenders until the market had actually collapsed, which is completely contrary to
what we did successfully in the Savings and Loan crisis, right? Even while the
institutions were reporting they were the most profitable savings and loan in
America, we knew they were frauds. And we were moving to close them down. Here,
the Justice Department, even though it very appropriately warned, in 2004, that
there was an epidemic...
BILL MOYERS: Who did?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: The FBI publicly warned, in September 2004 that there was an
epidemic of mortgage fraud, that if it was allowed to continue it would produce
a crisis at least as large as the Savings and Loan debacle. And that they were
going to make sure that they didn't let that happen. So what goes wrong? After
9/11, the attacks, the Justice Department transfers 500 white-collar specialists
in the FBI to national terrorism. Well, we can all understand that. But then,
the Bush administration refused to replace the missing 500 agents. So even
today, again, as you say, this crisis is 1000 times worse, perhaps, certainly
100 times worse, than the Savings and Loan crisis. There are one-fifth as many
FBI agents as worked the Savings and Loan crisis.
BILL MOYERS: You talk about the Bush administration. Of course, there's that
famous photograph of some of the regulators in 2003, who come to a press
conference with a chainsaw suggesting that they're going to slash, cut business
loose from regulation, right?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, they succeeded. And in that picture, by the way, the
other — three of the other guys with pruning shears are the...
BILL MOYERS: That's right.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: They're the trade representatives. They're the lobbyists for
the bankers. And everybody's grinning. The government's working together with
the industry to destroy regulation. Well, we now know what happens when you
destroy regulation. You get the biggest financial calamity of anybody under the
age of 80.
BILL MOYERS: But I can point you to statements by Larry Summers, who was then
Bill Clinton's Secretary of the Treasury, or the other Clinton Secretary of the
Treasury, Rubin. I can point you to suspects in both parties, right?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: There were two really big things, under the Clinton
administration. One, they got rid of the law that came out of the real-world
disasters of the Great Depression. We learned a lot of things in the Great
Depression. And one is we had to separate what's called commercial banking from
investment banking. That's the Glass-Steagall law. But we thought we were much
smarter, supposedly. So we got rid of that law, and that was bipartisan. And the
other thing is we passed a law, because there was a very good regulator,
Brooksley Born, that everybody should know about and probably doesn't. She tried
to do the right thing to regulate one of these exotic derivatives that you're
talking about. We call them C.D.F.S. And Summers, Rubin, and Phil Gramm came
together to say not only will we block this particular regulation. We will pass
a law that says you can't regulate. And it's this type of derivative that is
most involved in the AIG scandal. AIG all by itself, cost the same as the entire
Savings and Loan debacle.
BILL MOYERS: What did AIG contribute? What did they do wrong?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: They made bad loans. Their type of loan was to sell a
guarantee, right? And they charged a lot of fees up front. So, they booked a lot
of income. Paid enormous bonuses. The bonuses we're thinking about now, they're
much smaller than these bonuses that were also the product of accounting fraud.
And they got very, very rich. But, of course, then they had guaranteed this
toxic waste. These liars' loans. Well, we've just gone through why those toxic
waste, those liars' loans, are going to have enormous losses. And so, you have
to pay the guarantee on those enormous losses. And you go bankrupt. Except that
you don't in the modern world, because you've come to the United States, and the
taxpayers play the fool. Under Secretary Geithner and under Secretary Paulson
before him... we took $5 billion dollars, for example, in U.S. taxpayer money.
And sent it to a huge Swiss Bank called UBS. At the same time that that bank was
defrauding the taxpayers of America. And we were bringing a criminal case
against them. We eventually get them to pay a $780 million fine, but wait, we
gave them $5 billion. So, the taxpayers of America paid the fine of a Swiss
Bank. And why are we bailing out somebody who that is defrauding us?
BILL MOYERS: And why...
WILLIAM K. BLACK: How mad is this?
BILL MOYERS: What is your explanation for why the bankers who created this mess
are still calling the shots?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, that, especially after what's just happened at G.M.,
that's... it's scandalous.
BILL MOYERS: Why are they firing the president of G.M. and not firing the head
of all these banks that are involved?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: There are two reasons. One, they're much closer to the
bankers. These are people from the banking industry. And they have a lot more
sympathy. In fact, they're outright hostile to autoworkers, as you can see. They
want to bash all of their contracts. But when they get to banking, they say,
‘contracts, sacred.' But the other element of your question is we don't want
to change the bankers, because if we do, if we put honest people in, who didn't
cause the problem, their first job would be to find the scope of the problem.
And that would destroy the cover up.
BILL MOYERS: The cover up?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Sure. The cover up.
BILL MOYERS: That's a serious charge.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Of course.
BILL MOYERS: Who's covering up?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Geithner is charging, is covering up. Just like Paulson did
before him. Geithner is publicly saying that it's going to take $2 trillion — a
trillion is a thousand billion — $2 trillion taxpayer dollars to deal with this
problem. But they're allowing all the banks to report that they're not only
solvent, but fully capitalized. Both statements can't be true. It can't be that
they need $2 trillion, because they have masses losses, and that they're fine.
These are all people who have failed. Paulson failed, Geithner failed. They were
all promoted because they failed, not because...
BILL MOYERS: What do you mean?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, Geithner has, was one of our nation's top regulators,
during the entire subprime scandal, that I just described. He took absolutely no
effective action. He gave no warning. He did nothing in response to the FBI
warning that there was an epidemic of fraud. All this pig in the poke stuff
happened under him. So, in his phrase about legacy assets. Well he's a failed
legacy regulator.
BILL MOYERS: But he denies that he was a regulator. Let me show you some of his
testimony before Congress. Take a look at this.
TIMOTHY GEITHNER: I've never been a regulator, for better or worse. And I think
you're right to say that we have to be very skeptical that regulation can solve
all of these problems. We have parts of our system that are overwhelmed by
regulation.
Overwhelmed by regulation! It wasn't the absence of regulation that was the
problem, it was despite the presence of regulation you've got huge risks that
build up.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, he may be right that he never regulated, but his job was
to regulate. That was his mission statement.
BILL MOYERS: As?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: As president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which is
responsible for regulating most of the largest bank holding companies in
America. And he's completely wrong that we had too much regulation in some of
these areas. I mean, he gives no details, obviously. But that's just plain
wrong.
BILL MOYERS: How is this happening? I mean why is it happening?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Until you get the facts, it's harder to blow all this up. And,
of course, the entire strategy is to keep people from getting the facts.
BILL MOYERS: What facts?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: The facts about how bad the condition of the banks is. So, as
long as I keep the old CEO who caused the problems, is he going to go vigorously
around finding the problems? Finding the frauds?
BILL MOYERS: You--
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Taking away people's bonuses?
BILL MOYERS: To hear you say this is unusual because you supported Barack Obama,
during the campaign. But you're seeming disillusioned now.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, certainly in the financial sphere, I am. I think, first,
the policies are substantively bad. Second, I think they completely lack
integrity. Third, they violate the rule of law. This is being done just like
Secretary Paulson did it. In violation of the law. We adopted a law after the
Savings and Loan crisis, called the Prompt Corrective Action Law. And it
requires them to close these institutions. And they're refusing to obey the law.
BILL MOYERS: In other words, they could have closed these banks without
nationalizing them?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, you do a receivership. No one -- Ronald Reagan did
receiverships. Nobody called it nationalization.
BILL MOYERS: And that's a law?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: That's the law.
BILL MOYERS: So, Paulson could have done this? Geithner could do this?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Not could. Was mandated--
BILL MOYERS: By the law.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: By the law.
BILL MOYERS: This law, you're talking about.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Yes.
BILL MOYERS: What the reason they give for not doing it?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: They ignore it. And nobody calls them on it.
BILL MOYERS: Well, where's Congress? Where's the press? Where--
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, where's the Pecora investigation?
BILL MOYERS: The what?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: The Pecora investigation. The Great Depression, we said, "Hey,
we have to learn the facts. What caused this disaster, so that we can take
steps, like pass the Glass-Steagall law, that will prevent future disasters?"
Where's our investigation?
What would happen if after a plane crashes, we said, "Oh, we don't want to look
in the past. We want to be forward looking. Many people might have been, you
know, we don't want to pass blame. No. We have a nonpartisan, skilled inquiry.
We spend lots of money on, get really bright people. And we find out, to the
best of our ability, what caused every single major plane crash in America. And
because of that, aviation has an extraordinarily good safety record. We ought to
follow the same policies in the financial sphere. We have to find out what
caused the disasters, or we will keep reliving them. And here, we've got a
double tragedy. It isn't just that we are failing to learn from the mistakes of
the past. We're failing to learn from the successes of the past.
BILL MOYERS: What do you mean?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: In the Savings and Loan debacle, we developed excellent ways
for dealing with the frauds, and for dealing with the failed institutions. And
for 15 years after the Savings and Loan crisis, didn't matter which party was in
power, the U.S. Treasury Secretary would fly over to Tokyo and tell the
Japanese, "You ought to do things the way we did in the Savings and Loan crisis,
because it worked really well. Instead you're covering up the bank losses,
because you know, you say you need confidence. And so, we have to lie to the
people to create confidence. And it doesn't work. You will cause your recession
to continue and continue." And the Japanese call it the lost decade. That was
the result. So, now we get in trouble, and what do we do? We adopt the Japanese
approach of lying about the assets. And you know what? It's working just as well
as it did in Japan.
BILL MOYERS: Yeah. Are you saying that Timothy Geithner, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and others in the administration, with the banks, are engaged in a
cover up to keep us from knowing what went wrong?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Absolutely.
BILL MOYERS: You are.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Absolutely, because they are scared to death. All right?
They're scared to death of a collapse. They're afraid that if they admit the
truth, that many of the large banks are insolvent. They think Americans are a
bunch of cowards, and that we'll run screaming to the exits. And we won't rely
on deposit insurance. And, by the way, you can rely on deposit insurance. And
it's foolishness. All right? Now, it may be worse than that. You can impute more
cynical motives. But I think they are sincerely just panicked about, "We just
can't let the big banks fail." That's wrong.
BILL MOYERS: But what might happen, at this point, if in fact they keep from us
the true health of the banks?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, then the banks will, as they did in Japan, either stay
enormously weak, or Treasury will be forced to increasingly absurd giveaways of
taxpayer money. We've seen how horrific AIG -- and remember, they kept secrets
from everyone.
BILL MOYERS: A.I.G. did?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: What we're doing with -- no, Treasury and both
administrations. The Bush administration and now the Obama administration kept
secret from us what was being done with AIG. AIG was being used secretly to bail
out favored banks like UBS and like Goldman Sachs. Secretary Paulson's firm,
that he had come from being CEO. It got the largest amount of money. $12.9
billion. And they didn't want us to know that. And it was only Congressional
pressure, and not Congressional pressure, by the way, on Geithner, but
Congressional pressure on AIG.
Where Congress said, "We will not give you a single penny more unless we know
who received the money." And, you know, when he was Treasury Secretary, Paulson
created a recommendation group to tell Treasury what they ought to do with AIG.
And he put Goldman Sachs on it.
BILL MOYERS: Even though Goldman Sachs had a big vested stake.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Massive stake. And even though he had just been CEO of Goldman
Sachs before becoming Treasury Secretary. Now, in most stages in American
history, that would be a scandal of such proportions that he wouldn't be allowed
in civilized society.
BILL MOYERS: Yeah, like a conflict of interest, it seems.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Massive conflict of interests.
BILL MOYERS: So, how did he get away with it?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: I don't know whether we've lost our capability of outrage. Or
whether the cover up has been so successful that people just don't have the
facts to react to it.
BILL MOYERS: Who's going to get the facts?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: We need some chairmen or chairwomen--
BILL MOYERS: In Congress.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: --in Congress, to hold the necessary hearings. And we can
blast this out. But if you leave the failed CEOs in place, it isn't just that
they're terrible business people, though they are. It isn't just that they lack
integrity, though they do. Because they were engaged in these frauds. But
they're not going to disclose the truth about the assets.
BILL MOYERS: And we have to know that, in order to know what?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: To know everything. To know who committed the frauds. Whose
bonuses we should recover. How much the assets are worth. How much they should
be sold for. Is the bank insolvent, such that we should resolve it in this way?
It's the predicate, right? You need to know the facts to make intelligent
decisions. And they're deliberately leaving in place the people that caused the
problem, because they don't want the facts. And this is not new. The Reagan
Administration's central priority, at all times, during the Savings and Loan
crisis, was covering up the losses.
BILL MOYERS: So, you're saying that people in power, political power, and
financial power, act in concert when their own behinds are in the ringer, right?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: That's right. And it's particularly a crisis that brings this
out, because then the class of the banker says, "You've got to keep the
information away from the public or everything will collapse. If they understand
how bad it is, they'll run for the exits."
BILL MOYERS: Yeah, and this week in New York, at this conference, you described
this as more than a financial crisis. You called it a moral crisis.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Yes.
BILL MOYERS: Why?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Because it is a fundamental lack of integrity. But also
because, if you look back at crises, an economist who is also a presidential
appointee, as a regulator in the Savings and Loan industry, right here in New
York, Larry White, wrote a book about the Savings and Loan crisis. And he said,
you know, one of the most interesting questions is why so few people engaged in
fraud? Because objectively, you could have gotten away with it. But only about
ten percent of the CEOs, engaged in fraud. So, 90 percent of them were
restrained by ethics and integrity. So, far more than law or by F.B.I. agents,
it's our integrity that often prevents the greatest abuses. And what we had in
this crisis, instead of the Savings and Loan, is the most elite institutions in
America engaging or facilitating fraud.
BILL MOYERS: This wound that you say has been inflicted on American life. The
loss of worker's income. And security and pensions and future happened, because
of the misconduct of a relatively few, very well-heeled people, in very
well-decorated corporate suites, right?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Right.
BILL MOYERS: It was relatively a handful of people.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: And their ideologies, which swept away regulation. So, in the
example, regulation means that cheaters don't prosper. So, instead of being bad
for capitalism, it's what saves capitalism. "Honest purveyors prosper" is what
we want. And you need regulation and law enforcement to be able to do this. The
tragedy of this crisis is it didn't need to happen at all.
BILL MOYERS: When you wake in the middle of the night, thinking about your work,
what do you make of that? What do you tell yourself?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: There's a saying that we took great comfort in. It's actually
by the Dutch, who were fighting this impossible war for independence against
what was then the most powerful nation in the world, Spain. And their motto was,
"It is not necessary to hope in order to persevere."
Now, going forward, get rid of the people that have caused the problems. That's
a pretty straightforward thing, as well. Why would we keep CEOs and CFOs and
other senior officers, that caused the problems? That's facially nuts. That's
our current system.
So stop that current system. We're hiding the losses, instead of trying to find
out the real losses. Stop that, because you need good information to make good
decisions, right? Follow what works instead of what's failed. Start appointing
people who have records of success, instead of records of failure. That would be
another nice place to start. There are lots of things we can do. Even today, as
late as it is. Even though they've had a terrible start to the administration.
They could change, and they could change within weeks. And by the way, the folks
who are the better regulators, they paid their taxes. So, you can get them
through the vetting process a lot quicker.
BILL MOYERS: William Black, thank you very much for being with me on the
Journal.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Thank you so much.